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Social Implications of Climate Change in Latin America  
and the Caribbean 
Dorte Verner
Assumptions and Analytical Framework  
for Assessing the Social Implications of  
Climate Change 
Climate change compounds existing vulnerabilities by eroding 
livelihood assets. For the poor in particular, the detrimental ef-
fects of climate change on the environment erode a broad set of 
livelihood assets—natural, physical, financial, human, social, 
and cultural. The resilience of the poor to disaster is already 
low. Many depend directly on fragile natural resources for their 
livelihoods and well-being, and many live in environmentally 
fragile areas that are especially prone to natural hazards such as 
drought, floods, rising sea levels, and landslides. When circum-
stances change for the worse, the poor are hard put to adapt. For 
many, the effects of climate change are compounded by other 
pressures, including a growing scarcity of land viable for agri-
culture, joblessness, difficulty obtaining enough food, poor 
health, lack of education, social marginalization, and lack of ac-
cess to credit and insurance. Although livelihoods have con-
stantly adapted to change throughout history, it is very likely 
that the impacts of climate variability and change will push 
poor people beyond their capacity to cope. It is a fact that many 
indigenous peoples in LAC have already reached this point 
(Kronik and Verner 2010).
The progression of cause and effect sketched in figure 1 
shows how GHG emissions resulting from human activity are 
linked to their environmental impacts (step 1). This environ-
mental degradation affects the availability and quality of wa-
ter for human consumption (including domestic, agricultur-
al, and industrial use and power generation), as well as 
terrestrial and marine flora and fauna ecosystems. The envi-
ronmental impacts have social implications, as presented in 
step 2, affecting people’s livelihoods, food security, and health. 
Excessive stress on those determinants of human well-being 
Climate change is the defining development challenge of our time. More than a global environmental issue, climate change is 
also a threat to poverty reduction and economic growth and may unravel many of the development gains made in recent 
decades. Latin America and the Caribbean account for a relatively modest 12 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions,1 but communities across the region are already suffering adverse consequences from climate change and variabil-
ity (De la Torre, Fajnzylber, and Nash 2009). As highlighted in “Reducing Poverty, Protecting Livelihoods, and Building 
Assets in a Changing Climate” (Verner 2010), climate change is likely to have unprecedented social, economic, environmen-
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will increase poverty and income inequality. It may also cause 
migration to swell and has the potential to heighten the risk of 
conflict. 
To understand the social implications of climate variabili-
ty and change, it is useful to identify risk factors and protec-
tive factors. Although not necessarily causal, these factors can 
be important predictors, and understanding them can help 
shape policies and programs to strengthen people’s resilience 
and capacity to adapt. Risk or vulnerability factors increase 
the likelihood that a person or community will experience 
negative outcomes: experience shows that the risks associated 
with climate change increase when combined with poverty, 
poor governance, and poorly maintained infrastructure. How 
vulnerable people are to these risks often depends on local so-
cial, political, and economic realities and government poli-
cies. 
Protective factors increase the likelihood that a person or 
community will make a successful transition. Important fac-
tors that protect against the negative impacts of climate change 
exist at the household, community and societal levels, and in-
clude good public policies, such as provision of public health 
services, education, social protection schemes, and the like; so-
cial connectedness, whether to relatives, neighbors, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) or government agencies; solid and well-
maintained infrastructure; good governance; and healthy pub-
lic finances. 
Climate Variability and Change in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
Precise projections about climate variability and change in the 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region cannot be made. 
Too little detailed historical information is available on the re-
gion’s weather conditions, sea levels, and extreme events to al-
low robust regional climate models to be developed, and global 
climate studies yield relatively few robust statements and pro-
jections for the region (IPCC 2007a). 
Nonetheless, the available evidence clearly shows that cli-
mate change is taking place and gathering speed in the region: 
•	 Projected temperature changes. Overall, like the world as a 
whole, the LAC region is projected to warm. Most of 
South America is forecast to warm more than the global 
average, the exception being the Southern Cone. This im-
plies that, over most of the region, temperatures in all sea-
sons will continue to rise during the 21st century. Heat 
waves are likely to be more frequent and more intense, and 
the higher temperature level in general will tend to favor a 
longer warm season, with possible related extreme events 
such as hurricanes. In the high Andes, the temperature 
rise is projected to be greater than the mean values for the 
region. This means that less water will be stored because 
snow, ice, and glaciers will continue melting. In the Ama-
zon region, the expected higher temperatures are likely to 









STEP 1  
STEP 2  
key climate change 
indicators in LAC: 
•  rising air and sea 
surface temperatures
•  increasing intensity of 
natural hazards
•  changing precipitation
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worsen the destructive effects of deforestation and in-
crease the risk of wildfires. 
•	 Projected precipitation.  The patterns of probable change 
show dry areas becoming dryer and wet areas becoming 
wetter.2 Mean annual precipitation is projected to decrease 
over northern South America near the Caribbean coasts, 
as well as over large parts of northern Brazil, Chile and Pa-
tagonia, and to increase in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
around the equator, and in southeastern South America. 
The mid-continental areas, such as the inner Amazon and 
northern Mexico, are projected to become dryer during 
the summer months, with increased risk of droughts and 
forest fires. Annual precipitation is likely to decrease in the 
southern Andes, with relative changes being largest in 
summer. How annual and seasonal mean rainfall will 
change over northern South America, including the Ama-
zon forest, is uncertain. 
•	 Extreme events. Most areas of LAC have experienced several 
instances of severe weather in recent decades, with torren-
tial rain and hurricanes causing thousands of deaths and 
damaging properties, infrastructure, and natural resourc-
es. These events are widely interpreted as reflecting cli-
mate change and increased variability, but no formal scien-
tific detection of such a relationship at the regional level 
has been made.3 Neither is there evidence that the recent 
extreme events are less or more severe than those that may 
be experienced in the future. That said, the available mod-
els clearly suggest that the changes that will take place over 
this century will generally be in the more extreme direc-
tion, that is, more intensive precipitation, longer dry spells 
and warm spells, heat waves with higher temperatures 
than generally experienced up to now, and more numer-
ous, severe hurricanes. According to the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007a), further increases 
are expected in the number of floods and droughts and in 
the intensity of tropical cyclones (see figure 2). 
The countries in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, 
which are often assailed by intense hurricanes, can expect these 
storms to become even fiercer as a result of climate change. 
Other important issues are the destruction of coral reefs and 
the growing threat to southeast Pacific fish stocks due to in-
creasing sea surface temperatures. A rise in sea level would 
likely bring flooding to low-lying regions such as the coasts of El 
Salvador and Guyana and could exacerbate social and political 
tensions in the region. 
For the Andean countries, the most momentous climate ef-
fects include major warming, changes in rainfall pattern, rapid 
tropical glacier retreat, and impacts on mountain wetlands. 
These effects will combine with increasing precipitation vari-
ability to significantly affect water availability (IPCC 2007c). 
These effects may lead to greater migration and risk of conflicts. 
In the Amazon region, the most pressing issue is the risk 
that the forest will die back—that rising temperatures and de-
creases in soil moisture in the eastern Amazon region will lead 
to the replacement of tropical forest by savannah. When that 
danger is combined with the deforestation caused by human 
Figure 2: Key Climate Change Hot Spots for Latin America
Source: Verner (2010) based on IPCC (2007b).
 
coral reefs and mangroves seriously threatened with 
warmer SST
under the worst seal-level rise scenario, mangroves are very 
likely to disappear from low-lying coastlines
Amazonia: loss of 43% of 69 tree species by the end of 21st
century; savannization of eastern Amazonia
Cerrados: losses of 24% of 138 tree species for a temperature
increase of 2°C
reduction of suitable lands for coffee
increases in aridity and scarcity of water resources
sharp increase in extinction of: mammals, birds, butterflies, 
frogs, and reptiles by 2050
water availability and hydroelectric generation seriously
reduced due to reduction in glaciers
Ozone depletion and skin cancer
severe land degradation and desertification
Rio de la Plata coasts threatened by increasing storm surges
and sea-level rise
increased vulnerability to extreme events
Note: Areas in red correspond to sites where biodiversity is
currently severely threatened and this trend is very likely to continue.4  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
activities, the outlook is dire. If present deforestation trends 
continue, 30 percent of the Amazonian forest will have disap-
peared by 2050. That, with the transformation of tropical rain-
forest into dry grassland savannah, would lead to the extinction 
of a great number of plant and animal species unique to the 
area.
The overall effects of climate change will be negative in the 
LAC region. There will, however, be exceptions, particularly 
with respect to increasing temperatures. In the southernmost 
part of South America and in the Andes, rising temperatures 
will expand the range of some crops, and the higher concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere will increase 
yields. But elsewhere, crops such as coffee and maize are already 
being grown in close-to-optimum temperatures, so temperature 
increases, especially if coupled with declining rainfall, will lead 
to significant yield reductions. Higher temperatures not only 
will affect plant growth, but will also cause more heat- and dis-
ease-related stress and mortality for livestock and humans alike. 
The Road Ahead
Although many of the effects of climate variability and change 
are already unavoidable, much scope remains for human agen-
cy and ingenuity in crafting mitigation strategies to address the 
causes of climate change itself and in adapting to address the 
consequences.4 An optimal national strategy would employ 
both mitigation and adaptation efforts and should embody 
good governance and include public voice, representation, and 
social accountability.
It is critical that policy makers in LAC address the social is-
sues related to climate change. Even if global mitigation efforts 
improve, the climate trends that are already under way have 
considerable momentum and will dramatically affect econom-
ic, human, and social development for years to come. Thus, as 
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change argues, it is 
paramount that climate variability and change become fully 
integrated into development policy (Stern 2007). Social devel-
opment is key to efforts to reduce the loss of livelihood systems, 
forced migration, and potential conflicts. Indeed, an overriding 
message that emerges from the study that this note describes is 
that almost all of the policies, investments, and institutional 
reforms advocated here are good development policies. The re-
alities of climate change may give them added value, but, in 
most cases, they would have significant benefits even in its ab-
sence. Thus, when devising adaptation policies, they should be 
“climate-proofed” in the sense that they enhance resilience and 
enable adaptation. For example, physical infrastructure is in 
dire need of improvement, both to enhance people’s living con-
ditions and economic opportunities and to enable people to 
cope with climate change. At-risk communities need special at-
tention because risky climate situations are costly not just to 
the households affected, but to society at large. Although this 
note focuses on the external aspects of household and commu-
nity transitions, climate change is also affecting the psychologi-
cal transition—a period of breaking free of traditional patterns 
of thinking and resolving problems, of increased competition 
over resources, and of emphasis on the present over the future. 
The poor and vulnerable who live a day-to-day existence and 
lack the assets to allow long-term planning have little experi-
ence addressing these issues; they typically behave in ways that 
are rational for their objectives and perceptions of risk, which 
by necessity employ a very short-term perspective. Planning for 
a future with a changing climate is extremely difficult when an 
individual’s or a household’s asset base is barely sufficient to 
survive on from day to day, especially given frustrations that 
arise from economic turbulence, blocked participation, and 
marginalization in the community.
Although fraught with risks, climate variability and change 
also present opportunities for households, communities, local 
and national governments, society, and the economy. Decisions 
about adaptation strategies, developing skills, and engaging 
with the broader civic community will determine the quality 
of life for the next generation. With more knowledge about 
how climate change affects the poor and vulnerable, govern-
ments may be better able to understand and serve this group. If 
policy makers do not invest now in mitigation and adaptation, 
they will miss a unique opportunity to equip the poor and vul-
nerable populations with the tools to break the downward spi-
ral of poverty and inequality and become drivers of growth and 
sustainable development. 
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Notes
1. WRI (2005). The figure falls to 6 percent of global emissions 
if emissions from energy use only are taken into account. When 
land-use changes are included, the proportion rises to 12 per-
cent of the world’s GHG emissions, mainly as a result of the 5  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
large-scale deforestation taking place in the region. Yet, despite 
the region’s small contribution to global warming, its people 
still find their well-being, homes, and livelihoods threatened by 
climate variability and change. The inverse relationship be-
tween responsibility for global warming and vulnerability to its 
effects is often ignored (UNDP 2007).
2. There will be local exceptions to these broad tendencies, but 
existing models do not give robust results for every part of this 
large region. In particular, there are still many unresolved issues 
related to changes in the Amazonas, because important aspects 
of the interaction between vegetation and climate are still not 
well understood.
3. To formally attribute change or occurrence of particular 
events to a cause, a statistically sound number of events must 
normally be considered. By nature, extreme events are rare at a 
given location. Events that occur over a large geographical re-
gion, such as LAC, cannot simply be lumped together for study 
because the causal chains leading to them most likely differ 
from event to event and from location to location, which pre-
cludes a simple statistical treatment of the data. Therefore, the 
recent IPCC reports have very little to say about recent changes 
at a regional level, and even less about the national or provincial 
level, and their possible links with global climate variability and 
change.
4. The essence of mitigation policies should be to price carbon 
and carbon equivalent gases to reflect their true costs—includ-
ing social costs. This note does not address these policies in any 
detail. 
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